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Constructivism or scientific realism? Which is the better framework for educational 
research? 
 
Peter G. Cole Edith Cowan University
ABSTRACT 
The doctrines of constructivism and 
scientific realism have had a profound 
impact on recent progress in educational 
research. These doctrines are often 
depicted as conflicting doctrines in 
theoretical papers and methodology texts 
dealing with educational research issues. 
This paper explores the differences 
between the major tenets of constructivism 
and scientific reason. Different values 
ascribed to the scientific method in the 
context of these two doctrines are also 
examined. The paper focuses on three 
problems that have dogged the education 
research agenda: the conflict between the 
constructivist and scientific realistic 
viewpoints on science, the validity of 
observation statements and the role of 
relativism in science. An argument is made 
that discovery science is typically 
dependent on scientific realism, but that 
constructivism offers a counterpoint to the 
excessive scientism inherent in some kinds 
of empirical research. The most important 
differences, however, are probably found 
in their respective orientations to ~arch 
activity and problem-solving. The 
constructivist favours idiographic research 
and contextual analysis and the scientific 
realist is committed to nomothetic methods 
and empirical generalisation. 
 
The doctrines of constructivism and 
scientific realism have had a profound 
impact on the progress of educational 
research. The influence of these two 
doctrines has been demonstrated frequently 
in theoretical papers and methodology 
texts that deal with educational research. 
Recent issues of the Educational 
Researcher abound with references to the 
conflict between constructivism and 
scientific realism and the implications for 
qualitative and quantitative research 
methods (Eisner, 1992; Erickson, 1992; 
Gage, 109; Rizo, 1991; Schrag, 1992). 
This paper contains an outline of the major 
tenets of constructivism and scientific 
realism. In particular, the paper focuses on 
three problems that are central to the 
conflict between the constructivist and 
scientific realistic agendas: the conflict 
between the constructivist and scientific 
realist viewpoints on scientific activity, the 
validity of observation statements and the 
degree of relativistic thought in these 
doctrines. 
 Despite their more obvious differences, 
most constructivists and scientific realists 
agree on two major issues. First, they both 
accept the view that the tenets of primitive 
empiricism, especially those associated 
with the version of the theory known as 
logical positivism, are essentially 
untenable (Boyd, 1983). Exponents of both 
doctrines hold to the position that crude 
empirical approaches are a poor basis for 
any substantive scientific theory, mainly 
because collections of brute facts 
invariably lead to superficial 
phenomenalism (Scruton, 1994). Realists 
and constructivists contend that 
undisciplined observations are not 
productive of scientific interpretation 
(Boyd, 1983). Proponents of both doctrines 
doubt that the cumulative accretion of data 
from particular categories of events will 
result in the acquisition of valuable 
theoretical knowledge. 
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Second, realists and constructivists agree 
that their fundamental differences are 
concerned with the nature of scientific 
theories and their relationship with the 
substance and brute facts of phenomena 
(Hacking, 1982). They concur in the view 
that science is concerned with the 
development of theoretical constructs and 
generalisations about the world. Both agree 
that valid theories are based on coherent 
and well articulated abstractions, though 
the status of the logical structure of such 
propositions is often disputed by the 
respective parties. The main dimensions of 
difference between the constructivists and 
scientific realists are outlined in Table 1. 
The major propositions contained in their 
different doctrines are explicated in the 
sections that follow. 
THE CONSTRUCTIVIST’S VIEW ON 
THEORY AND THE NATURE OF 
SCIENCE 
Constructivists are committed to the view 
that the on-going search for theoretical 
knowledge in a scientific domain is 
governed by rivalry between competing 
scientific theories or paradigms. They 
claim that historical and contemporary 
research reveals the social and competitive 
nature of scientific endeavour. They assert 
that elaborate conceptual schemes derived 
from particular constructions of knowledge 
largely determine the nature of the 
scientific agenda at any one period of time 
(Kuhn, 1970). Constructivists assert that 
absolute theoretical truths are elusive. 
According to the constructivists true 
science is not monumental theory, rather a 
set of tentative theoretical abstractions and 
analytical constructions. 
Proponents of the constructivist doctrine 
contend that the typical scientist's views 
cannot be described in terms that are 
independent of the methodologies used to 
test their hypotheses. They maintain that 
scientists employ methods, analytical 
techniques and procedures that are biased 
toward particular conceptual categories 
(Feyerabend, 1975). Kuhn (1970) contends 
that those who have authored a particular 
scientific theory also show preference for 
particular scientific methods that are said 
to offer the best tests of the theory. 
Constructivists claim that scientific theory 
is so dependent on particular methods that 
the processes of theory building should be 
viewed as construction devices, not as 
discovery procedures (Boyd, 1983). 
Constructivists assert that the paradigms 
and methodologies adopted by traditional 
scientists predispose them to particular 
views of reality. They maintain that 
theoretical views on the nature of reality 
are linked with major paradigms that 
depend on circumscribed types of 
knowledge. Facts are selected in such a 
way as to fit with such preordained views 
of the world. This is a radical view of 
knowledge acquisition, the assertion being 
made is that theoretical science is not 
objective. However, the view is not new in 
philosophical discourse. It has a long 
history in epistemology, derived mainly 
from the scepticism inherent in much of 
British empiricism. Constructivists claim 
that much of what scientific realists call 
theoretical frameworks are abstract 
contrivances, and that these have validity 
only within the knowledge framework 
favoured by elite groups. They assert that 
theory in science is intimately linked with 
particular conceptual frameworks, and that 
many of these are as contentious today as 
they were one hundred years ago. Further, 
scientific theory cannot be unalterably true, 
since it is constantly changing and 
adapting to current scientific discoveries. 
Constructivists deny the possibility of 
immutable reality in the theoretical entities 
of modern science. They use historical 
analysis to justify their conclusions about 
the weak relationships between empirical 
discoveries, conceptual frameworks and 
theory in traditional science (Kuhn, 1970). 
 Those who support the constructivist 
agenda in education typically eschew the 
traditional scientific methods of 
quantitative science. Instead they advocate 
qualitative research and case study 
methods and stress the importance of 
analysis rather than discovery. They 
maintain that there is an essential 
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arbitrariness in much of scientific and 
educational research and theory. They 
emphasise context in the interpretation of 
social phenomena and personal experience 
is given a great deal of prominence. 
Constructivists are particularly critical of 
scientism: the view that only in traditional 
science and its applications can one obtain 
the answers to many of the problems that 
pervade our everyday affairs. 
THE SCIENTIFIC REALISTS VIEW 
ON THEORY AND THE NATURE OF 
SCIENCE 
Scientific realists maintain that science is a 
body of knowledge that reflects real world 
phenomena and that valid theory is 
independent of the phenomena it describes. 
The generalisations of scientific theory are 
said to explain the brute facts of the world. 
They maintain that traditional science 
supports the scientific method as the basic 
mechanism for. the development of 
reliable knowledge. Searle (1995) has 
recently made a strong plea in defence the 
realist's position that the propositions used 
to describe the world are different from the 
substance and features of the world. He 
adopts the view that questions about the 
nature of reality should be distinguished 
from questions about how one acquires 
knowledge of that reality. The first is an 
ontological question; the second an 
epistemological question. 
From the scientific realist's perspective, 
historical analysis reveals clear progress in 
the demonstration of improved theoretical 
representations of physical and social 
phenomena (Boyd, 1983). Consistent with 
this view, each scientific discovery is said 
to lead to a closer approximation of reality. 
Hypotheses derived from theory are used 
to direct the scientific agenda, but such 
constructs do not determine the outcome of 
scientific endeavour. Scientific theories are 
interpretations of phenomena that predict 
and explain phenomena. 
The justification for the scientific method 
rests on the processes of abduction. By this 
it is meant that the key statements of 
science offer the best possible explanation 
of observed relationships. There is no 
obvious discontinuity in the different kinds 
of scientific explanation that emerge with 
each stage of scientific discovery. Progress 
in science is largely incremental, with 
more substantive representations of reality 
being revealed with each set of significant 
discoveries. Those who support scientific 
realism contend that the scientific method 
is the best logically defensible procedure 
with which to examine the world and the 
complex relationships that emerge among 
phenomena. The scientific method is also 
the basis for resolving questions about the 
value of competing theoretical structures. 
Contentious issues involving different 
paradigms or theories are decided by 
objective analysis of evidence. The 
purpose of the scientific method is to free 
the investigator from the biases that may 
abound because of prejudice, false doctrine 
or incorrect theory. The discipline of the 
scientific method allows the research 
worker to differentiate those questions or 
problems that are of a purely empirical 
kind from those that are value-laden or 
those requiring further conceptual 
clarification. Most realists maintain there is 
an essential dichotomy between statements 
of interpretation and statements that 
purport to inform us about the nature of the 
world. 
Educators who support the scientific realist 
position adopt experimental and empirical 
viewpoints. They are typically strongly 
quantitative in orientation. Paradoxically, 
they are often sceptical of the results of a 
typical scientific investigation and 
constantly test the outcomes of such 
investigations and the accompanying 
theories and the predictions made in the 
name of science. They maintain that 
constructivism is essentially a sceptical 
philosophy that fails to recognise the high 
levels of prediction that follow the 
discovery of important scientific 
relationships. We now turn to the two 
issues that most divide the scientific 
realists and the constructivists. 1 refer to 
the matter of observation statements and 
relativism. 
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OBSERVATION STATEMENTS 
Beliefs about the nature of reality can be 
derived from direct contact with relevant 
objects, reports of observations, or 
representations of reality in the form of 
social facts. The first of these are called 
primary observations (Fodor, 1984). The 
reports of such observation statements are 
claimed to be the basis of much reputable 
science. Observation statements are said to 
be the foundation of knowledge and the 
scientific method allows summary 
statements of these observations. These, in 
turn, are used as the basis of theories and 
interpretations of phenomena. Searle's 
(1995) notion of brute facts can be 
included under this heading. The second 
kind of belief is based on knowledge that 
can be derived from sources other than 
direct observation. For example, scientists 
typically use the reports of other scientists 
to bolster their claims about certain 
phenomena and relationships among extant 
data. They argue that their judgements 
depend on the validity of observation 
statements made by others. Such secondary 
sources are typically perceived to be less 
reliable than direct observations (Fodor, 
1984). 
The third category includes social facts or 
institutional facts and these are dependent 
on a different level of representation of 
reality. Searle (1995) has suggested that 
such social facts are very different from 
the brute facts and secondary observations 
described above. For example, the 
proposition that Mt Kosciusko is the 
highest peak in the country is a social fact 
dependent on the government 
instrumentality that gave the peak its 
particular name. The brute fact is that the 
mountain exists; the secondary 
observations are included in maps or 
descriptions drawn by cartographers. 
Scientists usually stress that they claim 
knowledge of the brute facts of the world, 
but use others' reports and conventional 
social and scientific categories to classify 
and describe relationships among features 
of objects and events. 
The constructivist is usually sceptical of 
most of the claims made by realists about 
the objectivity of methods used to secure 
primary and secondary observations. They 
claim that much data gathering of the kind 
described above is dependent on 
preconceived views of the world. They 
claim that a typical scientist's theory 
determines the type of phenomena to be 
observed and that nearly all science is 
dependent on social facts, not brute facts. 
In particular, there is criticism of the 
extension or generalisation of particular 
scientific findings to other contexts or 
dimensions of experience (Fodor, 1984). 
The constructivist is critical of the realist's 
claim that the events observed by scientists 
are invariably reliable in different contexts. 
They also question whether there can be 
any extension of knowledge beyond the 
narrow confines of the particular instances 
of observation. 
The constructivist denies that the scientist 
can offer a guarantee that direct 
observations will lead to reliable theories 
about the nature of phenomena. The 
possibility of other theories leading to 
similar predictions must always be 
considered (Feyerabend, 1975). They also 
maintain that the conceptual frameworks 
used in scientific observation invariably 
change with each new investigation. The 
training of the scientist is also seen to be 
crucial in determining choices about 
methodology, research hypotheses and 
analysis of data (Kuhn, 1981). It is posited 
that the scientific community dictates 
standards in all fields of investigative 
endeavour and determines how data are 
observed and how problems are solved in 
these fields. 
Not surprisingly, the scientific realist 
challenges these claims. The realist replies 
that scientists are. constantly on guard 
against biased observations and inadequate 
theories. All observations are subject to 
checks done by others using alternate 
equipment, in other settings, and with other 
experimental subjects. Likewise, theory is 
subject to constant challenge and 
double-blind experimental procedures are 
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commonplace. Any observations that 
contain experimenter biases are rejected. If 
any of these observations lead to a conflict 
in the interpretation, then the conclusions 
drawn from those observations are 
rejected. Scientific realists recognise the 
tenuous links between observation and 
theory, but claim that the scientific method 
ensures that observations and their 
conceptual underpinnings are rigorously 
tested against valid criteria. They also 
claim that the theories they support must 
always have better predictive or 
explanatory power than any alternatives. 
Many realists have made their reputations 
by disputing facts and challenging the 
methods and techniques used to support 
established theories. This is Popper's 
(1975) agenda for the reputable scientist. 
Popper advocates a version of realism and 
asserts that all theoretical structures should 
be tested against alternative interpretations. 
He has proclaimed the tentative and 
hypothetical nature of all scientific 
theories. Scientific realists reject the view 
that they have secure purchase over 
theoretical constructs, even those with 
supposed impeccable credentials. 
Proponents of the opposed doctrines of 
realism and constructivism continue to 
debate these key issues. There is no 
resolution because each denies the 
premises of the other. Constructivists and 
realists are capable of pointing to the 
influence of external factors on the 
evolution of scientific thought. Both use 
historical analysis to confirm the 
prejudicial influence of elite scientific 
communities on scientific thought. 
RELATIVISM 
Advocates of constructivism deny that 
theoretical statements can be defined in 
terms of universally agreed criteria. 
According to their view, the validity of any 
set of statements can only be determined 
by reference to a particular context or 
observation. In a typical case, a context is 
defined in terms of relevance to a 
particular set of problems in a unique 
environment. Further, the measure of 
validity of any set of theoretical statements 
derived from such experience is 
determined by those confined to the same 
environment. 
Constructivists often question the logical 
status of the propositions in the realist's 
agenda. They challenge both the inductive 
and hypotheticodeductive arguments of 
modern science. The logical problems of 
induction were identified by Hume (1739) 
and his insights are as valid today as they 
were several centuries ago. Hume argued 
that it is futile to trust the proposition that 
the future will be like the past, the essential 
basis of inductive argument. In essence, 
the argument is that it is logically false to 
base any theory about future events on the 
supposed validity of past events. The 
hypothetico-deductive argument is placed 
in the same category. In such cases the 
propositions of science demand a 
conceptual framework determined before 
data are gathered and analysed. Either way, 
according to the constructivists, the 
scientific bases of the scientific realist lack 
a logical basis. 
The constructivist agenda is based on key 
tenets of relativism. Kuhn (1970) has said 
that "there is no standard higher than the 
assent of the relevant community" (p. 94). 
The relativist in this context argues that 
validity of any scientific proposition is 
determined by the judgements of 
colleagues in the same field. Kuhn's 
analysis of historical evidence has led him 
to support the view that there is constant 
adjustment of scientific viewpoints 
depending upon the cogency of prevailing 
views in established social and intellectual 
elites. Established paradigms in such 
circles determine the search for reality and 
these are also used to judge the validity of 
any conclusions drawn from research. 
The realists are opposed to the relativist 
agenda. Realists assert the status of reality 
is in ontological truth (Searle, 1995). They 
claim that the world is independent of 
particular theoretical claims or 
philosophical interpretations. The principle 
of meaningful assertion is important in this 
regard. This holds that there is a class of 
Australian Journal of Teacher Education 
 
46                                                                                                                                              Vol. 22 No. 1, 1997 
 
statements made about the world that can 
be confirmed or denied by empirical 
research. This is coupled with the principle 
of objective evidence. It asserts that any 
proposition should be capable of an 
independent validity check performed by 
other reputable scientists. It asserts that the 
ultimate truth of most theoretical 
propositions can never be completely 
verified, but that it is possible to falsify 
such claims by means of observation. Such 
fundamental tenets are claimed to counter 
to the themes of relativism espoused by the 
constructivists (Boyd, 1983). 
Realists dispute the essential tenets of 
relativism. Well known philosophical 
arguments are used to attempt to defeat its 
logic. Plato in the Theaetetus, was one of 
the first to denounce the relativist 
argument. Plato claimed that, using the 
competence of an individual as an 
example, that expertise depends upon 
knowledge and that to have competence is 
to have demonstrated knowledge. Plato 
then asked: can we agree that the 
competent individual differs from the 
incompetent? In responding to this 
question, the relativists are often 
confounded. If they argue that the 
competent individual exists then they must 
define the characteristics that differentiate 
the competent individual from others. If 
they argue that such characteristics do not 
exist, they are obliged to support the view 
that the incompetent individual has the 
same status as the competent. Likewise, 
the question can be asked whether a theory 
in science can be defined in terms of its 
characteristics of worth and good science 
differentiated from poor science. 
According to the realist, the constructivist 
invariably asserts a sceptical position, 
which is essentially unacceptable in the 
context of modern scientific opinion. 
The realist argues that science demands a 
measure of correspondence between the 
status of scientific propositions and 
phenomena in the real world. The realist 
need not support a correspondence theory 
of truth, rather a belief in the concordance 
of science and reality (Searle, 1995). If the 
facts correspond to the scientific 
hypotheses, or if the facts support or 
confirm the hypotheses then the 
conclusions are said to be valid. 
Independent observations are said to 
confirm or deny the truth of propositions 
of a scientific kind. Disagreements 
regarding particular beliefs are settled by 
reference to observational statements. If 
the observational statements do not support 
one kind of belief then that particular 
proposition is rejected. If not, then the 
proposition is tentatively accepted as a best 
possible explanation. 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
EDUCATION 
Theory construction is the critical issue in 
the debate between the supporters of 
constructivism and scientific realism in 
education. Traditional science has 
favoured the views of scientific realism. 
This doctrine was backed by educators in 
the past because of its links with traditional 
empirical science. Education was 
categorised as a social science and 
included in the disciplines that utilised the 
scientific method. Science was respected 
because of its apparent rigour, its seeming 
validity, and its capacity to inform 
educators about the effectiveness of 
particular methods in the classroom. 
However, in recent decades the status of 
traditional science in education has been 
questioned, in large part because research 
on schooling has been said to offer few 
findings of great utility and 
generalisability. The present opposition to 
scientific realism reflects a disenchantment 
with the links between the methods 
recommended by empirical science and the 
teaching procedures used in schools. 
More recently, theory building in 
education has drawn the attention of 
researchers from outside the traditional 
scientific mould. No longer is it the sole 
province of the scientific realist. This is 
partly because the central problems of 
education have shifted from generalised 
empirical findings to concerns about the 
individual teacher's experience of students 
in classrooms. Examination of the  
Australian Journal of Teacher Education 
 
Vol. 22 No. 1, 1997   47 
Australian Journal of Teacher Education 
 
48                                                                                                                                              Vol. 22 No. 1, 1997 
 
viewpoint of the individual teacher has 
become paramount in examination of 
teaching practice. Idiographic research has 
come to dominate much of the research 
agenda in education. Educators are 
encouraged to explore their own 
experiences and those of their colleagues 
and students when offering explanations of 
classroom activity. Experience with the 
particular problems of the classroom is 
claimed as instructive to other teachers in 
similar contexts. The case study is viewed 
as the major vehicle of research 
methodology. Theory building is integral 
to an individual teacher's actions and not a 
task requiring knowledge of experimental 
methodology. 
Relativism is inherent to all theory 
building according to those in the 
constructivist camp in education. Particular 
contexts are said to determine all spheres 
of action in teaching and learning. 
Wholesale generalisations of such 
experience are inappropriate because of the 
differences in each individual teacher's 
experience. Constructivists value 
qualitative and descriptive methods. The 
perceptions of the teacher dominate 
theoretical investigations and the 
individual's interpretations determine the 
study of educational experience. The 
personal perspectives that each individual 
brings to the classroom is seen to be 
critical to the analysis of the meaning of 
classroom events. 
Realists in the research field of education 
teaching object to many of the 
constructivist's views (Schrag, 1992). They 
continue to espouse the value of the 
scientific model for the analysis of key 
research questions. The realists in 
education remain committed to scientific 
research of the traditional kind. They claim 
that there are empirical questions that 
require value-free analysis and that the 
methods of science allow the best form of 
investigation at this level. The importance 
of the nomothetic methods that focus on 
general laws and proven principles remains 
dominant in universities and schools that 
favour the realist agenda. 
Many realists claim that an individual's 
experience of the world is not science and 
that excessive emphasis on case study 
methods leads only to an expansion of 
knowledge of individual activity. They 
claim that science does not promote 
analysis of individual values but should 
encourage the growth of knowledge 
general utility that can be useful to 
teachers. They are critical of the 
subjectivity and relativism of the 
constructivist agenda. They eschew the 
individualistic findings of the 
constructivists and press for greater 
objectivity in theory building and research 
endeavour. 
One doctrine is committed to idiographic 
research; the other has an obligation to a 
nomothetic agenda. The constructivist is 
persuaded of the value of individual 
experience and the implications of this 
kind of research to individual problem 
solving. The realist perceives more 
objectivity in the scientific method and the 
links with traditional science. The debate 
continues to engender strong responses 
from both sides of the divide. 
Academics in the field of teacher education 
have long been concerned with this 
problem. How do we justify our 
recommendations about how to teach and 
what strategies and methods should be 
employed in classrooms? Do we base our 
decisions on the case study methodologies 
and stress individual experience? Or do we 
adopt a different stance and look to the 
general principles derived from 
experimental methodologies? Most of us 
adopt the compromise position and use 
arguments from both sources to justify our 
advice to novice teachers. This is probably 
a good approach. Even so, we need to 
remind ourselves that there are different 
kinds of arguments needed to support these 
two categories of recommendation. 
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